Moltke's Projects for the Campaign of 1866 Against Austria by Field Marshal Graf Helmuth von Moltke

Author:Field Marshal Graf Helmuth von Moltke [Moltke, Field Marshal Graf Helmuth von]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Europe, France, Military, Wars & Conflicts (Other), Germany, Napoleonic Wars
ISBN: 9781787203655
Google: Ehn7DQAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2017-01-23T15:55:18+00:00

MEMOIR NO. 22. (Translation.)

April 2nd.

“The war against Austria, its probability or inevitableness as a political question is outside my judgment. But from my point of view, I think I ought to express the conviction that success or failure in this war essentially depends upon our determination to fight being reached sooner than that of the Austrians, and, if possible, now.

“Our advantage, which we cannot value too highly, consists in being able by the use of five railway lines to bring up our Army and have it in all essentials concentrated on the Bohemian-Saxon frontier in 25 days.

“Austria has only one railway to Bohemia, and allowing: for the troops she already has in Bohemia and Galicia, and assuming that her cavalry is already on the march, she requires 45 days to get together 200,000 men.

“If Bavaria joins Austria the disadvantage to us is not so much the Bavarian Army, as the probability that Bavaria will lend the Austrians her railway Regensberg-Pilsen-Prague, which will shorten the Austrian concentration by 15 days.

“If the mobilization of the Prussian Army is ordered now, Bavaria will hardly be able to get her 40,000 men collected at Bamberg before the first battle between Austria and Prussia has been fought. The assembly of a Bavarian Army can hardly have the aim of besieging Coblentz, or Cologne, or Erfurt, or of seizing Prussian territory, but more probably of waiting upon events and then taking the side of the victor.

“For us the important point is to strike down Austria, and for that purpose we ought to call up all our forces, including not only the VII but also the VIII Army Corps.

“We must, of course, seize Mainz, so as to prevent any invasion of the Rhine province; in that case the VII and VIII Army Corps will be a more direct threat upon Munich if they advance to Prague, than if they are concentrated at Mainz.

“If we can manage to prevent Bavaria from allowing the Austrians to use the railway from Reichenberg, we shall still have the advantage of the initiative, provided we mobilize the army at once.

“If Austria wants the alliance of Saxony she must assist in the defence of that country; we shall be at Dresden, with the IV, VII, and VIII, and Guard Corps on the 31st day with 100,000 men.

“If the Austrians advance with all that they now have in Bohemia to the support of Saxony we should there find only 74,000 men.

“For upon only one line the Austrians could not, before the 31st day, get more than 100,000 men together, and they would be compelled to face our I, II, III, V, and VI Corps, which make together more than 150,000 men.

“We should therefore probably have a great superiority tooth in Saxony and in Bohemia for the first battles.

“But if the Austrians are allowed to use the Bavarian line they can bring up by the 31st day their maximum force of 240,000 men.

“Whether their finances and the political situation will allow the Austrians to deploy such a force is a question I need not decide.

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